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Reproducibility (or lack thereof, such as in biomedical sciences, cf. Goodstein1, or 
notoriously in psychology) affects more than the validation of experiments. Often, 
assumed reproducibility justifies transforming experimental evidence into convenient law 
(“evidence-based” policy, cf. Sarewitz2).  Failed reproducibility—almost exclusively in 
life science experiments—stands in contradistinction to experiments in “physics or 
astronomy or geology” (Goodstein). These knowledge domains are identified as test 
provable, not by accident, as we shall see.  
The crisis of reproducibility, which the American National Academies is examining 
as well, should not go to waste.  It is an opportunity for opening a discussion of the 
relation between various knowledge domains and the need to adapt research methods to 
the specific dynamics of the subject that scientists attempt to describe.  
Not yet articulated—to the best of my knowledge—is the call to the scientific 
community to re-evaluate the underlying assumptions upon whose basis knowledge 
acquisition and confirmation are pursued. Massively failed reproducibility has 
encouraged finger-pointing and palliatives, but not the critical re-evaluation of the 
epistemological perspective. In particular domains, 80% of published results, from 
researchers who earned the respect of their peers, proved to be irreproducible. Therefore 
the thought that something might be off with the expectation that research, no matter 
which subject or purpose, is best validated through reproducible experiments cannot be 
wished away. The understanding of what Newton called Nature, under which label he 
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aggregated both the physical and the living, might prove as inadequate in our time as it 
was when it was articulated. 
After vitalism was debunked, science rejected the distinction between the living and 
the non-living. This in itself is quite surprising, since in science you don’t throw away a 
question because it was improperly answered. The foundational works in defining the 
living of Walter Elsasser3 and Robert Rosen4 (not to mention Schrödinger5), advancing 
views of nature different from those of Newton and his followers, were pretty much 
ignored at the time they were published. Their arguments, quite different in their 
perspectives, deserve a closer look at this moment of questioning research and validation 
methods of life sciences. The living is heterogenous, purposeful, and anticipatory; the 
non-living is homogenous, purpose-free, and reactive. If indeed, to know is to be aware 
of distinctions—especially those of fundamental nature—variations cannot be eliminated 
by fiat.  
While physics and physics-based disciplines (such as chemistry) adequately describe 
the non-living, there remains a need for a complementary perspective that expresses the 
nature of life. What defines this perspective is that the specific causality characteristic of 
life is accounted for by integrating past, present, and possible future. The living changes 
in a way different from the non-living. 
Taking Gödel’s concept of decidability (the logic pertinent to axiomatic systems used 
in arithmetic operations) and applying it to defining knowledge domains is an 
opportunity.  
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Fig. 1. Unbounded world as open system 
 
Fig. 2. Characterizing the physical and the living 
 
 But the focus in this alternative view is not on Gödel’s rigorous logical proof, as it is 
on the notion of decidability, extended here from the formal domain to that of reality. 
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Definition: A subject is decidable if it can be fully and consistently described. Indeed, 
physics, astronomy, geology (mentioned by Goodstein), knowledge domains where 
reproducibility is close to 100%, represent descriptions of dynamics (how things change) 
that can be complete and consistent. Such descriptions undergird predictions—the 
expected output of science. 
Thesis 1: The threshold from the decidable to the undecidable is the so-called G-
complexity (G for Gödel, obviously; Nadin6).  
Thesis 2: Change is the outcome of interaction. 
The living, in its unlimited variety of ever-changing forms is G-complex, i.e., 
characterized by undecidability. For non-living physical entities, interaction takes the 
specific form of deterministic reaction, expressed in physical laws (such as those 
expressed in Newton’s equations or in Einstein’s theory of relativity). For the living, 
change is the outcome of interactions in which the physical (the dynamics of action-
reaction) is complemented by anticipatory expression: current state contingent upon 
possible future state. Living interaction is not reducible to the physical action-reaction 
sequence. The description of physical interaction conjures quantity, and results in data. 
The description of living interaction conjures quality, and results in information, i.e., data 
associated with meaning (Wheeler7).  
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Fig. 3. Change is the outcome of interaction  
 
As a consequence, to expect experiments involving the living (of interest not only to 
psychology, but also to the biomedical sciences and many other fields of inquiry pertinent 
to life) to be reproducible is epistemologically equivalent to reducing the living to its 
physical substratum, and biology to physics and chemistry. Information, characteristic of 
life, is not physical (Lopez-Suarez8). Too often, such experiments turn out to be mere 
instances of conditioning (psychology outperforms every other known discipline in this 
respect). The outcome is more testimony to the ignored limits of perception (the well-
documented time resolution of one tenth of a second, cf. Canales9) and to how well the 
subject was conditioned. This limited understanding of causality is occasionally 
transcended in modern science (and not only in the quantum mechanics perspective). 
Nevertheless, it is still the dominant view. (Just take a look at the Call for Proposals in 
the biological sciences that the National Science Foundation puts out.) 
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Mapping from an open system (extending from the cell to the whole human being) of 
extreme dynamics to the closed system of the experiment (which by definition is 
supposed to be decidable) might result in reproducibility. But what is reproduced is a 
false assumption, not a path to knowledge about change. The validity of some 40,000 
fMRI studies, and more broadly the interpretation of neuroimaging results, was recently 
questioned (Eklund, Nichols, Knutsson10), after the fMRI (25 years old) technology itself 
was critically assessed (Shifferman11). False-positive rates of up to 70% concerning its 
most common statistical methods, which have not been validated using real data, are 
actually a proof of a misguided assumption.  
More recently, brain activity has become the object of computational modeling. There 
is much to gain from computational models in physics applications (the Juno space 
mission is only a recent example). Their intrinsic limitation in studying living processes 
stems from the fact that algorithmic computation captures only the deterministic aspects 
of change. Therefore the guaranteed reproducibility of computational neuroscience 
experiments conjures knowledge and validation not about the brain, whose deterministic 
and non-deterministic aspects complement each other, but about algorithmic 
computation. Interactive computation, in line with the dynamics of interaction of the 
living in general, and of the brain in particular, is rarely considered (Nadin12, 13). 
As impressive as the Human Genome project was, it is a good example of 
irreproducible experiments. It was generated under the reductionist assumptions of a 
blueprint—published as such (Science, 16 February 200, Vol. 291, Issue 5507)—of a 
homo sapiens that does not change over time, i.e., epigenetics ignored. What was 
extracted is a truncated image of gene syntax. The 1000 Genomes Project (2008-2015), 
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aimed at studying variation (initially ignored) and genotype data, is an example of an 
improved understanding but yet another irreproducible experiment. It affords empirical 
data, i.e., access to some semantic aspects of gene expression. The goal, probably not yet 
on the radar of scientific inquiry, should be the pragmatic level, where meaning is 
constituted in the context of life unfolding in an anticipatory manner.  
This idea is relatively well illustrated by the entire cycle of reproduction. Pregnancy 
(Brunton, Russell14) is a convincing example of anticipatory expression underlying 
creation, i.e., the birth of some entity that never existed before. Actually, the living is in a 
continuous state of remaking itself, sui generis re-creation of its constitutive cells—each 
different from the other—and thus of the entire organism. The constancy of physical 
(non-living) entities, even those of extreme dynamics (such as black holes), stands in 
contrast to the variability of any and all organisms and the matter in which they are 
embodied.  
An assumption similar to that of the Human Genome governs the current Connectome 
project. It will be ten or one hundred times more costly than the Genome project, but not 
better in reporting on the variability of the cortex. Windelband’s15 view of nomothetic 
science—expressed in universally valid laws (such as Newton’s laws of mechanics)—and 
idiographic science—diachronic processes subject to empirical observations—could as 
well guide in defining new methods for gaining knowledge peculiar to the living. 
Bernstein16 wrote about the “repetition without repetition” characteristic of the living as 
an expression of its dynamic variability. This is yet another argument in favor of finally 
transcending the machine view characteristic of Cartesian determinism and reductionism. 
Gelfand’s17 take on the matter points in the same direction: “There is only one thing 
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which is more unreasonable than the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in 
physics, and this is the unreasonable ineffectiveness of mathematics in biology.” Progress 
in science renders the need for a “new Cartesian revolution,” at the forefront of science’s 
efforts to better understand change in the specific manner in which it characterizes life. 
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